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Abstract 
Current debates surrounding the NHS contract in England are suggesting that it is in need of change 
to support an integrated health and social care transformation agenda that meets the needs of an 
ageing chronically ill population. This paper describes a three phase project in England that sought to 
develop and validate a whole systems contracting model for integrated health and social care 
focusing on older people with long term conditions, and based on joint outcomes. A participative 
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mixed-method approach for the development of the contracting model was used; this consisted of 
1) a literature review, 2) a design phase drawing on consensus method through stakeholder 
discussions and 3) an international validation phase. The final contracting model consists of four 
overarching and interrelated core elements:  (i) outcomes; (ii) partnership, collaboration and 
leadership; (iii) financial: incentives and risk; and (iv) legal criteria. Each core element has a series of 
more detailed contracting criteria, followed by further specifications attached to each criteria. While 
the policy environment appears to be conducive to change and encourages the adoption of new 
ways of thinking, there are difficulties with the implementation of new innovative models that 
challenge the status quo, and this is discussed. The paper concludes with reflections on the way 
forward for local development and implementation. 
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Contract model, integrated care, joint outcomes. 
 
Introduction 
The desire to provide health and social care in a more integrated manner has long been a feature of 
government policy (eg. DHSS 1972), with different operational responses through the decades. The 
aims however have remained somewhat constant - to encourage increased implementation and 
improvement of integrated health and social care, promoting independence at home, and reducing 
unplanned hospital admission. In recent times, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 has provided yet 
another focus for the development of new approaches and innovations across England. Health and 
Wellbeing Boards have been established to enable better co-ordinated multi-agency working; the 
Better Care Fund, launched in 2013, has been set up to facilitate joint working through the pooling 
of budgets between Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and local authorities to improve 
efficiency and avoid duplication; and 25 Integration Pioneer sites have been created, aiming to share 
knowledge about how health and social care services can work together to provide better support at 
home.  
In addition to this, E,^ŶŐůĂŶĚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚŝƚƐ ‘&ŝǀĞzĞĂƌ&ŽƌǁĂƌĚsŝĞǁ ?(NHS 2014) which selectively 
reflects some of the aspects of the 2012 Act, and as a consequence, 35 Vanguard sites have become 
viable, focusing on New Care Models - different forms of new integrated care provision through 
multi-speciality community providers, primary and acute care systems, urgent and emergency care 
networks, acute care collaborations and enhanced health in care homes. To support this, national 
bodies such as NHS Improvement have a specific remit to work with providers and local health 
systems to help them improve.  
Ambitions, expectations and aspirations around this agenda are high. But the history of making 
integrated care work in the UK has been long and tortuous, with considerable and sometimes 
insurmountable fragmentation between services that have created difficulties with, for example, 
employing joint budgets and establishing workable cross-sector contracts (Hudson 2013). 
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Commentators agree that the current NHS contract is in need of change to support an integrated 
health system that meets the needs of an ageing chronically ill population (Addicott 2014).  The 
predominance of activity-based payment in the acute sector (designed to tackle waiting lists), and 
block budgets in community services, offer little incentive to increase activity or efficiency in these 
settings and shift care from the hospital setting (Marshall et al 2014).  McGough (2014) questions 
ŚŽǁďƵĚŐĞƚƐĨŽƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĐĂŶďĞ ‘ƵŶůŽĐŬĞĚ ?ĨƌŽŵƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐĂƌĞ ?ŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƐĂŶĚ
local authorities. While the Better Care Fund may be a mechanism for this, currently organisations 
are at different points in their integrated care journey (Better Care Fund 2016/17), so a clear picture 
of how this will benefit the transformation agenda has yet to emerge.  
Marshall et al (2014) argue that for frail older people the situation is even more complicated, 
especially when assessing the contractual relationship between payment, incentives and outcomes. 
For example, to address needs, different services will need different payment methods and different 
forms of incentivisation. While it may be appropriate to incentivise a process where it is clearly 
linked to an outcome, more complex outcomes with multiple determinants will need a different 
approach.  
 
Prompted by observations such as these, the notion of joint outcomes is being debated, especially 
within the context of the re-emergence of the outcomes based commissioning approach (Kerslake 
2006; Billings & de Weger 2015; www.cobic.co.uk; Taunt et al 2015).  Views call for a single joint 
performance framework to ensure that NHS, social care and other services work together to 
improve outcomes for patients and service users (Humphries & Curry 2011; Kippen & Reid 2014).   
 
Other commentators also point out that new approaches and innovation may be possible through 
NHS contractual forms using overarching contracts and models such as the prime contractor or 
alliance contract (Addicott 2014; McGough 2014; Billings & de Weger 2015; lh alliances 2016 
http://lhalliances.org.uk/). McGough in particular notes that introducing integration successfully 
must include commissioning alignment, effective use of contracting terms, developing an 
appropriate service specification, and contract management.  
With DĐ'ŽƵŐŚ ?Ɛ (2014) opinions in mind, the current contracting system could be criticised for not 
being sufficiently flexible and forward thinking to embed areas such as advanced assistive 
technology (AAT) and industry providers in a meaningful way. Currently, industry providers remain 
peripheral to the main delivery event in integrated care, and their central involvement in a contract 
specifying joint outcomes for example may overcome problems associated with device use, 
sustainable operability and user acceptability (Billings et al 2013). 
Given these arguments, it is clear that current information on implementable integrated care 
contracting approaches that would work across services at the systems level, incentivise agencies to 
work to joint outcomes, enable the embedding of AAT and have a good fit with the transformation 
agenda are lacking. There are examples of areas that employing new contracting models (see lh 
alliances 2016; Addicott 2015; NHS RightCare 2016 www.rightcare.nhs.uk/ ; Taunt et al 2015), so 
within this context, investigating a way of reshaping local contracting processes to better support 
integrated care delivery would seem worthwhile. Such an approach would enable contracting to be 
more tailored to the aspirations of local commissioners and providers.  
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It is for this reason that a project was commissioned in Kent in 2014 by the former Kent and Medway 
Commissioning Support Unit (now South East CSU, to become North East London CSU from April 
2017) to develop a new contracting model, conducted by the first author and initiated by the second 
author. Kent is a progressive county; it has both an Integration Pioneer site and two Vanguard sites. 
In addition two CCGs are establishing Integrated Accountable Care Organisations. The environment 
and motivation to develop and test such as model would seem therefore to be present.  
 
Aim of the project 
The purpose of this project was to develop and externally validate a contracting model blueprint for 
integrated health and social care for older people with long terms conditions that was: 
x Focused on integrated care; 
x Collaborative and based on achievable joint outcomes;  
x System focused and;  
x Based on evidence of good practice.  
The overall aim of the contracting model was to ensure high quality integrated care to support self-
management and end of life care, in keeping with the English policy agenda. A further objective was 
to promote innovative care pathway transformation through embedding and accelerating the use of 
AAT.  
Method 
The project took place over a year, ending in January 2015. A three phase participative mixed-
method approach for the development of the contracting model was used; this consisted of 1) a 
literature review, 2) a design phase using group discussion and 3) a validation phase. Methodological 
approaches to phases 2 and 3 are described and rationalised here, and a critical overview of the 
processes are presented in the discussion. 
Phase 1 
In phase one, an international literature review of contracting approaches, models and designs was 
conducted. This is reported in a previous publication; while eight models were identified, the 
publication specifically provides a critical account of four models currently under debate, namely 
Accountable Care Organisations, the Alliance model, the Lead Provider model and Outcomes-Based 
Commissioning and Contracting (Billings & de Weger 2015). The purpose of this review was to 
provide material to underpin phase two design group discussions with concepts, ideas and examples 
of good practice. An important feature of the review was to capitalise on learning from agencies and 
industries external to the NHS and transpose key messages into the developing model, enabling 
ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ‘ďůƵĞƉƌŝŶƚƐ ?ĨŽƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĐontracting approaches to emerge.  
Phase 2 
In phase two, a Kent-wide design team of 25 representatives from CCGs, primary care, acute and 
community providers including mental health, a care home, social care, public health, the voluntary 
sector and the AAT industry, were convened to develop the model. The group was multi-disciplinary 
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and participants included GPs, nurses, commissioning support personnel, health and social care 
managers, legal and contracts personnel, and industry technologists.  
The main methodological focus of the group was to draw upon consensus development method, as 
it helps to organise qualitative thinking and judgements particularly when creativity is required 
(Black 2006). Groups generally bring a wider range of experience and knowledge, with interaction 
stimulating the consideration of more opinions, particularly when participants are multi-disciplinary. 
They also challenge received wisdom and promote group agreement (Murphy et al 1998). Some 
structure was needed and to this end, a clear operative plan was developed with the group from the 
onset, consisting of a set agenda per session with milestones to be reached over a six month period.  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ‘ďůƵĞƐŬŝĞƐ ?ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐǁĂƐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚĂŶĚ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ
contracts, group members considered what ideal components for a contracting model would look 
ůŝŬĞ ?dŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶŶĞůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘ƐŚĂƌƉĞŶĚ ?ŽĨĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐǁĂƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
were able to ground thinking into practical realities of what was possible without restricting 
creativity. In line with consensus method, group members were provided with a synthesis of the 
literature review in a digestible manner for them to consider.  
The design group met six times on a monthly basis for an afternoon and discussion groups were 
organised and facilitated by the main author. The initial session was concerned with extracting and 
agreeing on a set of overarching contracting elements and ensuing sessions elaborated on each one 
in turn, all the time discussing and getting consensus on their value and practical application. 
Thoughts and ideas were captured both on flip chart paper during the meetings to act as a visual 
stimulant for group members and to enable reflection on what had been agreed, and also 
electronically to record the rationale for consensual decisions. In between group meetings, 
discussions were converted to model design and circulated for review and comment by the first 
author. Each session reviewed progress and consensus reached from the previous session, before 
moving the model development on.  
Phase 3 
Phase three consisted of a validation phase. Given that the model had been a regional development 
and from an English perspective, conducting a consultation process as a means to provoke further 
discussion and ensure applicability across a broader sphere of contexts was seen as an important 
inclusion (Billings & Leichsenring 2005). The draft model has been assessed through consultation 
with five national and four international contracting, legal and long term care experts, and with 
organisations such as Monitor and NHS England in the UK, and the European Centre for Social 
Welfare Policy and Research in Austria. In addition it has been presented at webinars, conferences 
and discussed with numerous CCGs and professionals from other Commissioning Support Units 
across England. Overall, those experts and bodies consulted expressed favourable opinions, 
describing the model as innovative and ambitious. They were in agreement that the contracting 
model has face validity and potential in the field of integrated care and older people. All recognised 
however that there needed to be concrete testing before full confidence in the model could be 
gained, an aspect discussed later. 
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The Contracting Model 
As a first step in the development of the model, the design group extracted values and principles 
that were sympathetic to what they wanted to achieve. These guiding principles ĂĐƚĞĚĂƐ ‘ĂŶĐŚŽƌƐ ?
to thinking and influenced how the eventual contracting model was designed. This multi-disciplinary 
thinking proved to be important  ? as the literature review indicated, there is very little hard 
evidence for what works in contracting (Billings & de Weger 2015).  Figure 1 portrays the outcome of 
these guiding principles; placing the person at the centre of the model was fundamental to thinking, 
with an inner core of four person-centred principles reflecting individual and community level ideals. 
This is surrounded by service-oriented principles that are geared towards innovation, partnership 
and joint working.  
Figure 1 Overarching Principles 
 
The principles reflected not only the literature review undertaken in preparation of the project, but 
also the overall aims of integrated care working (Leichsenring et al 2013; Oliver et al 2014; Goodwin 
et al 2014) and best practice aspirations in this area drawn from the professional literature (Billings 
2005) and design group experiences. With reference to the literature review a number of ambitions 
within the different models were also influential, examples from four contracting models are given 
below:  
x Accountable Care Organisations (ACOs) stress the importance of having a leadership 
committed to improving value and quality for their patients (Porter 2012), the skills and 
infrastructure necessary to manage the financial risk, and an information technology system 
capable of processing and sharing internal and external data with the ability to deliver key 
information to providers and patients (Miller 2011). ACOs are also strong on incentives to 
encourage health systems to ůŽŽŬĂƚĂůůƚŚĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞůǇĂĨĨĞĐƚƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?
Centre for Health Services Studies      www.kent.ac.uk/chss ½#¾
Be holistic and 
person-centred
Promote self-management and 
independence
Achieve quality integrated care
Embed cultural 
values, trust & 
commitment
Motivate and 
incentivise the 
workforce
Have shared 
rewards and 
risks
Be flexible and 
adaptive
Be cost-
effective
Overarching principles:
The model will
Promote inclusion and equal 
access to care
Be achievable 
and 
measureable
Consider 
workforce 
challenges
Enable 
change, 
innovation and 
autonomy
Embed 
technology
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health status, including the social determinants of health. Incentives also promote healthy 
choices to their patient population, their employees, and the communities they serve, as 
those choices reinforce the preventive orientation of the health care delivered within an 
ACO (Corbett & Kappagoda 2013).  
x The Alliance model focuses on the importance of trust, partnership, collaboration and 
commitment. There is a risk share across all parties and collective ownership of 
opportunities and responsibilities; alliances involve a closer and more interdependent 
relationship (Bruner & Spekman 1998; Zoller 1999; De Jong & Klein Woolthuis 2008). This 
model is seen as ideal for integrated care because it drives collaboration between all parties. 
Contracts are not separated from improvement and transformation initiatives, they are an 
integral part of them and promote innovation (lh alliances 2016; Mayer & Treece 2008). 
x Principles underpinning the Lead Provider model also have a strong focus on integrated care, 
based around both the needs of patient groups and individual patients and with the aim of 
keeping patients as independent as possible at home and out of hospital (Corrigan & Laitner 
 ? ? ? ? ?K ?&ůǇŶŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ?ĚĚŝĐŽƚƚ ? ? ? ? ?.  
x Outcomes based commissioning principles are concerned with contracting services at the 
individual service user level on the basis of measurable outcomes rather than tasks. This is 
purported to achieve service change and person-centred care for all service users taking into 
account ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌƐ ?ƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐ. It must be driǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵƐĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ
and aspiration, and not something imposed upon them (Paley & Slasberg 2007). Taunt et al 
(2015) add to this by stating that outcomes-based commissioning seeks to solve the issue of 
how financial flows and the commissioning process can best support quality and efficiency 
across the system. 
 
These underlying principles therefore influenced the development of the final contracting model, 
which consists of three layers of detail. There are four overarching and interrelated core elements:  
(i) outcomes;  
(ii) partnership, collaboration and leadership;  
(iii) financial: incentives and risk; and  
(iv) legal criteria.  
Each core element then has a series of more detailed contracting criteria, followed by further 
detailed specifications that need to be taken into consideration when forming the contract (tables 1-
4 listed after references). Some commentary regarding the rationale for the development of each of 
the core elements will now be given. 
Outcomes Contracting Criteria 
With reference to the underpinning principles, a key feature of the outcomes contracting criteria 
(table 1) was the development of person-centred joint outcomes, as this was seen to be pivotal to 
the contracting model.  
 
A first step was for the stakeholder group to draw upon the current outcomes frameworks in 
England, as they are in common use across CCGs. These included the NHS Outcomes Framework 
2013-14 (DoH 2012); the Public Health Outcomes Framework 2013-16; (DoH 2012) the Adult Social 
Care Outcomes Framework 2013-14 (DoH 2012); and End of Life NICE guidelines (NICE 2013). These 
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frameworks consist of a wide range of outcomes and indicators for establishing health and social 
care performance and wellbeing. Criticism has been levelled against these frameworks for being 
separate and not united, potentially threatening effective joint working at a local level, and reducing 
benefits for patients and service users (Humphries & Curry 2011). So aligning them in this research 
study to create a single outcomes framework for contracting seemed an appropriate endeavour. 
While there was initially some concern about the sensitivity of the outcomes to integrated care, 
some synergy with the principles was discovered. In addition to these, the work of Nick Hicks of 
COBIC (Capitated Outcome-Based Incentivised Commissioning available at www.cobic.co.uk ) was 
drawn upon, particularly in relation to the development of the Oxfordshire Frail Elderly Outcomes 
Framework (2013). Overarching person-centred joint outcomes were agreed upon through this 
process, then coupled with the most relevant combined outcomes themes from the frameworks (see 
table 1  ? source of combined themes is referenced). 
 
The idea of how these would be used in practice is illustrated in figure 2: while all agencies (a 
suggested but not exhaustive list) would work towards the joint outcomes, there would also be 
individual deliverables that each organisation would work towards, that would be measurable and 
derived from the combined outcomes themes. 
 
Figure 2: Working towards joint outcomes. 
 
Partnership, Collaboration and Leadership Contracting Criteria 
Contracting criteria here focused on key aspects felt to be central to the success of this core theme 
(table 2). Drawing from the literature associated particularly with the Alliance contracting model (eg 
De Jong & Klein Woolthuis 2008), the ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘sharing ?ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚůǇǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽ
PROVIDERS
INDIVIDUAL	
DELIVERABLES
MEASUREABLE	JOINT	
OUTCOMES	FOR	
PATIENT	BENEFIT
Community Health 
Care 
Social Care
Acute Care Preventing people from 
dying prematurely
Peaceful death
Enhancing quality of life
Positive experience of 
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independence
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priority issues such as purpose and vision, benefits and risks, and information. Added to this, 
corporate culture is important as it affects many critical aspects of management and operations, 
such as how quality standards are internalised, decisions are made, and service users are treated 
(Kale et al 2000). Creating ĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŶĞƐƐ ?flows from this. Network structures 
and relational characteristics have become increasingly prevalent in the study of how firms find and 
exploit market and technological opportunities through knowledge sharing (Andersson et al 2005) 
and governance arrangements (Lin et al 2011). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998 p244) define relational 
ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚŶĞƐƐĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐƉĞŽƉůĞŚĂǀĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?. Key facets of relational embeddedness include interpersonal trust and 
trustworthiness, overlapping identities, and feelings of closeness or interpersonal solidarity by 
emphasising the importance of openness, honesty and transparency between organisations. 
/ŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚ
communication processes was factored into the design, reflecting not only the guiding principles of 
motivation, change and innovation, but also to capture the drive needed for service transformation.  
Referring to the specifications to consider on this table, aspects such as recognising and using 
partner strengths, establishing formal governance, planning cycles, decision-making and problem-
solving pathways as well as creating technological solutions are key ingredients (lh alliances 2016). 
Leadership is also key, particularly within integrated care and is closely linked to successful 
partnership and collaboration (Corrigan & Laitner 2012). 
 
Financial: Incentives and Risk Contracting Criteria 
As can be seen within these contracting criteria (table 3), the concepts of sharing and encouraging 
organisational harmony are also at the heart of this element. It emphasises the sharing of financial 
rewards, and intellectual and physical resources, but also risks and costs, again influenced by the 
Alliance model. Coupled with this, design features seek to create a positive innovating environment 
for incentivising and motivating sharing by working towards a common identity through  ‘branding ? 
 ?ƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚĂůƐŽŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĞůĞŵĞŶƚĂƐ ‘ŚĂǀŝŶŐĂcollective 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƌŽůĞƐĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?, and harmonising local intellect and networks to support 
innovation throughout organisations. Emphasis upon local autonomy and freedom to develop 
innovation emanated keenly from design group discussions, where experiences were more seen as 
 ‘ƐƚŝĨůŝŶŐ ?ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀŝƚǇǁŚĞŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŶĞǁǁĂǇƐŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĚĞůŝǀĞƌǇ ?^ŽĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇǁĂƐƐĞĞŶ
as an important factor in contracts going forward. 
dŚĞƉŽǁĞƌŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂŶĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ‘ďƌĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶĨůƵence in healthcare is a relatively 
new area (Gapp & Merrilees 2006), but is gathering momentum with the Vanguard status and recent 
introduced notion of ACOs where organisations are keen to carve out an identity. Gapp & Merrilees 
(2006) argue that harnessing the power of branding through a genuine commitment to a cross 
disciplinary approach, has the potential to take forward organisational change, quality care that is 
innovation driven, and transformation, where the workforce is considered as equal partners in 
creating an organisation of excellence. Such a notion seems worthy of inclusion within a contract. 
 
 
  
10 
 
 
Legal Contracting Criteria 
The design group recognised that a cornerstone of a contract is the legal underpinning in order to 
create the conditions for change and ensure standards of governance and accountability are in place 
and adhered to (Nöldeke G & Schmidt KM 1995) (table 4). Contracts in integrated care that are 
between organisations create their own complexity, and in this case legal criteria will need to 
support a systems approach working towards joint outcomes.  
For example, establishing a contract currency that is valid and acceptable across sectors will be 
important. Flexibility in how contracts are drawn up and operationalised is a predominant theme 
within the elements of the contract, and here it was acknowledged that flexible contracts that 
accounted for variability in duration and value with review dates rather than end dates, would 
better support joint working. Issues concerning the legal environment such as creating the stability 
for cross-sector working need to be in place, as do key factors associated with intellectual property 
such as where and when ownership and rewards can be shared, and when it is not appropriate. To 
support partnership working, there needs to be clear governance about how the relationships 
should work, with the provision of provider agreements concerning issues of money and 
responsibilities, and the entry and exit of partners (Mayer & Treece 2008). 
 
Discussion 
 
dŚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ƐĂŝŵǁĂƐƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂǁŚŽůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚĐĂƌĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚmodel that is more 
suited to the new policy agenda and meets local requirements. A model has been developed that 
has its operational basis within an integrated care system, is person-centred and grounded in 
available evidence and the most applicable principles of existing models, and embraces wide-ranging 
collaboration and partnership as a pathway to achieving joint outcomes. It has been exposed to 
many health and social care academics and professionals and gained acceptability in the course of its 
validation, and may have the potential to support the transformation. Predominant aspects such as 
partnership, collaboration, leadership and the focus on person-centred joint outcomes are appealing 
and have a good fit with qualities that are needed to succeed (Goodwin et al 2014). Given the 
contextual and operational complexities as expressed by McGough (2014), Marshall et al (2014) and 
others, in the absence of testing, the model could arguably be compared with the policy agenda as 
being equally ambitious. In this section, potential challenges for pragmatic adoption into the real 
world setting are discussed in three main areas  ? the evidence base, support given by policy, and the 
appetite for change. To start with however, a critical overview of the methodological processes 
involved in developing the contract model is provided. 
dŚĞƐƚƵĚǇǁĂƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚďǇŽŶĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ‘ĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂĐƌŽss the health and social care 
sectors, who convened the group for the study. As with all groups involving busy representatives 
working in a variety of health and social care agencies, maintaining the momentum of involvement 
over a six month period was challenging. Membership also changed with deputising and new posts. 
This did affect progress with conceptualising and agreeing content and tended to prolong 
discussions ĂƐƉĞŽƉůĞ ‘ĐĂƵŐŚƚƵƉ ?. Each session for example was dependent upon learning from the 
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previous one, and on the one hand it became difficult to maintain fluidity of thinking, but on the 
other we gained new critical group members who challenged content and rationale as the structure 
became more defined. In order to ensure input from members unable to attend (in particular the 
NHS contracts members to ensure that the criteria were grounded), we sought feedback and 
opinions in between where possible. Some scepticism was evident in the process; members were 
unsure for example whether the contracting criteria could be transferable to the NHS and social care 
context, particularly the relational aspects of partnership and trust connected to risk and reward 
sharing. This concern is largely supported by the wider literature, which infers that partnerships in 
industry frequently  ‘ƌĞǀĞƌƚƚŽƚǇƉĞ ?ĚƵĞƚŽƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐŽĨĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ, and ultimately break down 
(Augustine & Cooper 2009).  
Although the last two groups of the six month study consisted of eight members, it was of interest 
that representation from the IT industry and the Commissioning Support Unit was maintained 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚ ?dŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ďƌĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŵĂƌŬĞƚŝŶŐĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ?&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů P/ŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ
and Risk) and intellectual property (Legal) were noticeable, and it could be argued that this provided 
the end product with a more outward-facing appeal. 
The importance of the consensus method quickly became evident, in that there would never be total 
agreement on a defined content and associated wording, but reaching a  ‘ŚĂƉƉǇ ?ĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ became 
the goal. There were many heated debates about what should be included and converted to 
contract criteria. This was particularly the case for the outcomes contracting criteria; faced with a 
multitude of different outcomes frameworks and measurements, what would be the best way of 
selecting and grouping these in a contract to foster meaningful joint working? Are they actually 
appropriate for a contract of this nature? For this and other contracting criteria, tŚĞŵĞƐĂŶĚ ‘ůŽŶŐ
ůŝƐƚƐ ?ǁĞƌĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚfrom the discussions and the first author analysed and created structure in 
between meetings for discussion and agreement at the next.  
Given the reduction of group membership to develop the model and the potential for bias in 
emphasis of certain content, the validation process took on a heightened degree of importance. As 
mentioned in the methods section, the resultant model was exposed to some clear experts in the 
field and a number of organisations that are currently reviewing their contracting processes. 
However, the reactions were the same. The contracting model certainly seemed to connect to the 
audiences ĂƐĂ ‘ŐŽŽĚŝĚĞĂ ?but the lack of a clear implementation plan alongside uptake and testing 
discoloured the positive view.  
This leads on to a broader discussion of the potential challenges for pragmatic adoption. Firstly, the 
spotlight is upon evidence  ? do new contracting models bring about the desired change? Despite the 
widespread desire to promote integrated working through new contracting approaches, their 
evidence-base in achieving successful outcomes does not appear to be convincing nor strong 
(Billings & de Weger 2015). Areas that have already adopted models such as the Alliance and prime 
contractor have encountered problems. Addicott (2015) for example examined experiences of 
commissioning and contracting for integrated care in the English NHS, through case studies of five 
health economies that are implementing novel contracting models. Findings indicated that the cases 
have largely relied on the vision of individual teams or leaders, alongside external legal, 
procurement and actuarial support.  
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In addition, an examination of outcomes-based commissioning in the NHS has demonstrated that it 
is promising as a means to help transform healthcare, but evidence to support it remains limited and 
it is proving harder to implement than foreseen (Taunt et al 2015). Indeed, while the Oxfordshire 
Frail Elderly Outcomes were drawn upon in our model, in reality there was conflict between the CCG 
and its main acute and mental health providers as they strove to implement their plans and move 
away from activity-based contracts (McLellan 2013). Taunt et al and Addicott conclude that careful 
learning and significant support is needed to help it live up to its potential, and that operating novel 
contractual approaches will require determination, alongside advanced skills in procurement, 
contract management and commissioning. Marshall et al (2014) add to this by stating that there is 
currently limited evidence and guidance to support financial incentivisation of outcomes, in part due 
to the fact that outcomes are difficult to measure and attribute. It is generally acknowledged that 
outcomes are distant in time from the care activity and influenced by many variables, making clear 
links to specific provider actions problematic.  
Secondly, some commentary on the supporting policy is provided. On the face of it the policy 
structures within Health and Social Care Act 2012 would appear to be in place, although historically, 
political integrated care imperatives do not seem to have brought about the anticipated widespread 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?dŚĞĐƚ ?Ɛ ‘ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ the Better Care Fund has decidedly mixed reviews. For 
example, a prevailing belief as articulated by McGough (2014), is that the effective pooling of funds 
across organisations is vital in delivering integrated care at any scale. He adds that there is the 
potential local flexibility for the parties to agree to move to different and innovative financial models 
which depart from activity based payment structures and more towards alternatives. However its 
sceptics are not convinced that essentially relabelling a pot of money will create a sudden 
organisational collaboration to reshape the care system, and may even result in their own 
organisations losing services and money (Smith 2014). Fundamentally, it is not yet apparent that the 
policy structures can fully succeed in skewing resources away from the acute sector towards home-
based community care, nor that there is sufficient incentivisation to channel resources and  effort 
towards targeting the highest risk populations. 
Thirdly, the discussion considers the appetite for change. Such doubts surrounding evidence and 
policy have the potential to foster a climate of uncertainty surrounding new contracting models, 
demanding the question as to whether the drive to support them is still evident among 
commissioners, providers and politicians alike. This appetite is perhaps being dulled even more by 
investigations, such as the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough CCG partnership contract (NAO 2016). 
This CCG commissioned an innovative integrated contract with a budget of about £0.8 billion to 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŝƚƐŽůĚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂŶĚĂĚƵůƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĨƌŽŵhŶŝƚŝŶŐĂƌĞWĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ - a limited 
liability partnership formed from two local NHS foundation trusts. The five-year contract started in 
April 2015 but was terminated after only eight months because it ran into financial difficulties. The 
investigation highlighted gaps in specialist procurement advice, an insufficient sum to help redesign 
the service, and contractual terms that exposed the CCG to significant unintended risks and potential 
costs. Despite the fact that the NAO reported significant and widespread stakeholder support for the 
innovation and ambition surrounding the contractual model, the desire for cultural change clearly is 
not enough to be converted to a successful outcome. With such a lot at stake, fears about replicating 
these mistakes may deter others from embarking on such complex partnership contracts and hinder 
progression with innovation.  
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Conclusions: Implications and reflections. 
There is no doubt that implementation of a new type of contract model will be difficult. Despite this 
and on a more optimistic note, McGough (2014) explains that new approaches and innovation are 
possible through overarching contracts. He adds that there is not a one size fits all model for 
integration and different schemes such as in Torbay have adopted approaches which suited their 
specific circumstances. The integrated contracting model should be developed and refined to fit the 
ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚŶŽƚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?DĐ'ŽƵŐŚĂŶĚĚĚŝĐŽƚƚ (2015) seem to be 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ‘ďĞƐƉŽŬĞ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚeveloped in our study 
may have more success and applicability. This view is supported by the NHS Clinical Commissioners, 
who see CCGs becoming more strategic, with the emergence of a range of contracting models that 
grow from local initiatives rather than a centrally driven template approach (NHS Clinical 
Commissioners 2016).  
But while debates around contracting methods take place, there is still the local imperative to move 
forward with transformation and improved care for those most in need. Some innovators are 
ďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĐĂƌĞŚŽŵĞƐ ?(see the National Association of Primary 
Care at www.napc.co.uk/primary-care-homes), which navigate around local contract and 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐďǇĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂ ‘ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁŝůůŝŶŐ ?ƚŽĚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŚŝŶŐĨŽƌƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐ ?dŽ
make this happen ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌďŽĂƌĚƐ ?ǁŝƚŚDĞŵŽƌĂŶĚƵŵƐŽĨhŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚo 
govern how they work together (Steve Kell www.larwoodsurgery.co.uk). Our model in Kent is being 
tested by bringing together adult social care, enablement services, intermediate care and paramedic 
practitioners, ƚŽ ‘ĚƵŵŵǇƌƵŶ ?ƚŚĞnew contract alongside current contracts which will help identify 
any problems and challenges with application and adjust accordingly.  
The local context would seem to be therefore an important starting place for contracts. Such organic 
developments may promote more meaningful ways of creating local incentives and joint outcomes 
to bring about the wholesale changes that seem to have eluded health and social care agencies for 
so long. 
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Table 1: Outcomes Contracting Criteria 
Outcomes Contracting Criteria 
Joint Outcomes  Specifications to consider (outcome themes) 
Preventing people from 
dying prematurely 
 Reducing premature mortality from the major causes of death (NHS1; PH4) 
Improving recovery from injuries, trauma, stroke, fragility fractures (NHS3) 
People are protected as far as possible from avoidable harm, disease and injuries (ASC4A) 
People are supported to plan ahead and have the freedom to manage risks the way that they wish (ASC4A) 
   
Enhancing quality of 
life 
 Enhancing quality of life for people with LTC (NHS2; PH4) 
Slowing the rate of progression of frailty and vulnerability (OxFEO) 
People are protected as far as possible from avoidable harm, disease and injuries (ASC4A) 
Enhancing quality of life for carers so that carers can balance their caring roles and maintain their desired quality of life (NHS2; ASC1) 
   
Positive experience of 
care 
 /ŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƐĞĂŵůĞƐƐĐĂƌĞŝŶĂůůƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐ ?E,^ ? ? 
People are discharged from hospital to their place of choice with relevant support in place (OxFEO) 
People who use social care and their carers are satisfied with their experiences of care and support services (ASC3) 
Safeguarding adults whose circumstances make them vulnerable and protecting from avoidable harm (ASC4) 
   
Maximum self-care and 
independence 
 Ensuring people feel supported to manage their condition (NHS2) 
People manage their own support as much as they wish, to be in control of what, how and when support is delivered to match their needs (ASC1) 
People know what choices are available to them locally and what they are entitled to, and who to contact when they need help (ASC3) 
When people develop care needs the support they receive takes place in the most appropriate setting and enables them to regain their 
independence (ASC2) 
Patients and their carers are informed, supported and have access to advice about their care, and are engaged in the planning of care, treatment and 
care plans (OxFEO) 
Helping older people to recover their independence after illness or injury 
   
Peaceful death  Improving the experience of care for people at the end of their lives (NHS4) 
Key: NHS = NHS Outcomes Framework 2013-14; PH=Public Health Outcomes Framework 2013-16; ASC=Adult Social Care Outcomes Framework 2013-14; EoLNICE=End of Life NICE guidelines 
2013; OdFEO=Oxfordshire Frail Elderly Outcomes. Numbered references marked in () relate directly to the outcomes framework documents and their domain numbers.   
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Table 2: Partnership, Collaboration and Leadership Contracting Criteria 
Partnership, Collaboration and Leadership Contracting Criteria 
Contracting Criteria  Specifications to consider 
Shared purpose and 
vision 
 Establish common goals and objectives of what needs to be achieved 
Ensure a shared value-base and culture throughout the partnership, reflected through policies, procedures and guidance 
Ensure equality and diversity 
Expand strategic competencies 
Commitment to high quality outcomes and cost efficiencies 
   
Shared benefits and 
risks 
 Pool assets, share knowledge and resources, understand risks  
Shared ownership of development and design within partnership 
Collective ownership of opportunities and responsibilities 
   
Relational 
embeddedness 
 Contract must specify how partners should interact: Trust, openness, commitment, loyalty, honesty, transparency, co-operation, interdependency 
   
Active partnership 
 Having a collective understanding of roles and identity 
Structural embeddedness based on ownership ties to support the employment of formal governance arrangements 
Establish formal governance, legal and accountability arrangements  
Have a plan for integrated commissioning service delivery and redesign aligned to goals 
Have a well-designed planning cycle and local framework where commissioning and delivery plans are reviewed 
Establish a mechanism for managers, staff and service users to contribute towards the planning cycle 
Acknowledge and utilise core strengths of partners 
Ensure innovation and expedite access to technologies 
Establish networks to share learning and promote best practice 
Foster a dynamic environment that responds to change 
Shared and clear decision-making and problem solving, with strong commitment to resolving issues without litigation 
Capitalise on cultural differences 
Have clarity and equality on levels of collaboration and partnership within a potential alliance of partners 
Evidence-based developments 
   
Active communication 
 Clear lines of communication 
Target communication effectively 
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Consistency of messages throughout the organisations 
Have a common language 
   
Information sharing 
 Universal access to relevant data between partners 
Establish robust electronic data capture mechanisms 
Establish governance procedures, and consistent pathways and processes for data sharing and interrogation 
   
Clear leadership 
 Establish a leader with an advisory board that is not affiliated to one organisation 
Create clear leadership structure to take forward the shared purpose and vision 
Establish a leadership forum for leaders within the partnership 
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Table 3:: Finance: Incentives and Risk Contracting Criteria 
Finance: Incentives and Risk Contracting Criteria  
Contracting Criteria  Specifications to consider 
Sharing of financial 
rewards 
 According to joint outcomes and key performance indicators      
Robust ways of measuring improvements and providing evidence 
   
Sharing of risk and 
costs 
 Risk associated with complex untested situations 
Building safeguards and transparency 
Recourse to negotiation if high risk of losing money 
   
Sharing of intellectual 
and physical resources 
 
 Sharing of knowledge and learning  
Sharing of intellectual property ownership as a principle 
Workforce and skills transfer 
Data-sharing and communication 
Developing effective systems to collect and interpret data 
   
Branding as an 
integrated service 
 
 Harnessing shared values of partnerships especially trust 
Positive impact on reputation  
Publicity and dissemination of good practice 
   
Local autonomy for 
developing services 
 
 Freedom to innovate and change service delivery  
Flexibility in how services are delivered and funded 
Agreed level of oversight 
   
Pioneering innovation 
 
 Having an innovation process to support the workforce  
Access to academic support through local universities and the Academic Health Science Network 
Linking to local innovation platforms, eg Kent Innovation Pioneer Hub 
,ĂǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚůĞǀĞůŽĨĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞůŽĐĂůŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵǁŚĂƚǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ 
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Table 4: Legal Contracting Criteria 
 
Legal Contracting Criteria  
Contracting Criteria  Specifications to consider 
Flexible contracts 
 
 Aligning contract duration, value of contracts and access to contracts to the requirements of joint outcomes and policy changes 
Making provision for review rather than having end dates 
Alignment with relevant third party agencies 
   
Contract currency  
 
 Making and incentivising contract currency conducive to joint outcomes 
Designing contract currency without inhibiting productivity 
   
Legal environment 
 
 Creating conditions and stability to allow people to work unhindered across organisations (eg consideration of company law, NHS and LA statute, 
competition law, Official Journal of the EU and how they are interpreted) 
Creating conditions to promote investment 
   
Policy and guidance 
framework 
 Ensuring they are working at a local level to support joint outcomes 
Managing conflict 
   
Intellectual property 
 
 Clear declaration of where and when ownership and rewards can be shared 
Clarity around where and when sharing is not desired 
   
Liability in partnerships 
 
 Having a balance of risk 
How partnerships are defined (eg industry not having any clinical responsibility) 
Clarity of responsibility regarding service termination 
Governance issues in relation to clinical issues, data sharing, safe-guarding 
Complaints management 
   
Partnership governance 
 
 How relationships within the corporate partnership should work 
Having provider agreements (regarding for example money, responsibility) 
Having clarity of ownership around assets 
Having clarity around entering and exiting partnerships 
   
Plain language  Having accessible contracts understood by all 
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